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THE WISCONSIN STATE LEGAL SYSTEM
AND INDIAN AFFAIRS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: A LOST CHAPTER IN
WISCONSIN'S LEGAL HISTORY
BRIAN VANDERVEST*
I. INTRODUCTION
As Wisconsin developed as a state during the nineteenth century, its
supreme court and legislature devoted time and effort to resolving disputes
relating to Indian affairs. While there was no doubt that the federal
government reigned supreme over the realm of Indian law, the policies that
the federal government created were not impermeable constructions that
completely divested state governments from addressing issues regarding
Indians. Simply put: Holes existed in the federal policies.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the federal government
removed an indigenous people from its soil. At the same time, the federal
government attempted to trade with them, educate them, civilize them, and
provide them with an adequate area to live. In the midst of all of this, the
federal government also sought to open the American frontier to expansion,
develop natural resources, admit new states to the union, and placate the fears
of states already admitted. Furthermore, states sought to establish their own
identities while also attempting to expand and develop state resources and
land. In essence, the complexities of developing and settling a nation
precluded the federal government from divesting all Indian matters from the
purview of the state.
This Article examines the issues relating to Indian affairs that arose
outside the scope of federal authority and found their way into the Wisconsin
legal system. To that end, this Article briefly examines early federal law and
also describes Wisconsin's Indian tribes. Throughout the nineteenth century,
these tribes had numerous contacts with the federal government and
. Associate, Quarles & Brady LLP. B.A. History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995; J.D.
Marquette University Law School, 1999. Mr. Vandervest's main area of practice is environmental
law. This paper was originally written for a Wisconsin Legal History seminar. The author wishes to
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experienced increased exposure to federal policies. However, in many
instances, the application of these policies resulted in ambiguities regarding
interactions between Indians, the state, and the citizenry.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court and state legislature did not address these
ambiguities with an eye towards challenging federal authority. Rather, the
court and legislature worked within the framework of federal law to the extent
possible and established "state" law only when necessary.
II. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
In the nineteenth century, the President and Congress solidified the federal
government as the primary force in Indian affairs by generating and
implementing Indian policies such as civilization, education, removal, and
reservation. The Supreme Court used the doctrines of discovery and conquest
to justify ultimate federal authority over Indian lands. In addition, the Court
asserted federal control over Indian tribes by classifying them as domestic
dependent nations not subject to state laws. Ultimately, in order to both
protect Indian tribes and to provide for the development of the nation, the
Court and Congress sought to keep Indian affairs within the realm of federal
authority.
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
In a series of early nineteenth-century cases, the United States Supreme
Court established the federal government as the primary authority in Indian
Law. In the first of these cases, Fletcher v. Peck, the Court briefly addressed
the very nature of Indian title to land.' Chief Justice John Marshall first noted
that courts should respect Indian title.2 However, Marshall also added a
caveat: Courts should respect Indian title "until it be legitimately
extinguished., 3 Once extinguished, the land would be subject to seisen in fee
on the part of the state. Thus, in 1810, the Supreme Court laid a legal
foundation through which the federal government could legitimately divest
Indians of their title to land.
Although not an Indian law case per se, Fletcher announced the Court's
theory regarding the acquisition of Indian lands. Thirteen years later, in
1. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 185 (1962) [hereinafer PRUCHA, POLICY].
Although the court addressed it, the nature of Indian title was peripheral to the ultimate issue of the
case. In Fletcher, the Court was primarily concerned with the authority of the state of Georgia to
pass a law that annulled the title of a good faith purchaser. The issue of Indian title arose because in
1763, Great Britain reserved the land in question to Indians. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 141.
2. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
3. Id. at 143.
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Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, the Court made this theory the
very basis of future Indian policy. 4  The case concerned two parties who
claimed title to the same parcel of land in Illinois. One party received title by
a patent from the federal government.5 The other party received title from
Thomas Johnson, who acquired the land directly from an Indian tribe.6
Marshall framed the issue as whether Indians had the power to give, and
private individuals had the power to receive, title to land.7 In answering this
question, Marshall examined the doctrines of conquest and discovery.
Regarding discovery, Marshall stated that it "gave title to the government by
whose subjects or by whose authority it was made.",8 Thus, the rights of
native people "were necessarily diminished... by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."9
The doctrine of conquest, however, authorized only the acquisition of
title. 10  Conquest gave the United States a mechanism to exercise its
"exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy."" Marshall
stated that "title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force," and the
"conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or safely
governed as a distinct people."' 12 In essence, Indian title amounted to mere
occupancy that the United States, as conqueror, could easily take away.
Furthermore, because of their status as the conquered, Indians were "deemed
incapable of transferring the absolute title to others."' 3 Ultimately, Marshall
held that based on the doctrines of discovery and conquest, the party who
received title from the Indians did not "exhibit a title which [could] be
sustained in the courts of the United States."'
' 4
Whereas Fletcher and Johnson established the federal government's rights
and authority regarding title to lands, two later cases delved into the actual
4. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see also Karl J.
Kramer, Comment, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the
Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional Determinations, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 989,
1000-03 (1986).
5. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 554-61.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 572. At the outset, Marshall explicitly stated that the Indians were in rightful
possession of the land they sold. Id.
8. Id. at 573.
9. Id. at 574.
10. Marshall theorized that under the discovery doctrine, the United States actually acquired
title to American soil from France and Great Britain. Id at 574-85.
11. Id at 587.
12. Id. at 589-90.
13. Id. at 591.
14. Id at 604-05.
2003)
MARQUE7TE LA W REVIEW
legal status and rights of Indians themselves.' 5  In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, the Cherokee tribe sought an injunction from the Supreme Court to
restrain Georgia from executing certain state laws. 16 Justice Marshall, who
again delivered the opinion of the Court, noted that the crucial issue was
whether the Court had original jurisdiction to hear a case brought by an Indian
tribe. 17  The answer rested on the legal status of the Cherokee Nation.
Marshall first held that the Cherokee were not a state of the union, nor were
they aliens, nor were they a foreign nation.18 Developing a new classification,
Marshall described Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" whose
relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to his guardian."' 19
Nothing in the Constitution granted the Court original jurisdiction over
domestic dependent nations; thus, the injunction was denied.
Worcester v. Georgia marked the first case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the authority of a state over Indian matters. 20 Georgia prosecuted
Worcester and other missionaries for failing to obtain a permit to reside on the
Cherokee territory as required by state law. Worcester appealed his case to
the Supreme Court, arguing that the state law was "repugnant to the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.",21 However, the issue in
this case extended beyond Worcester's conviction. Counsel argued that
Georgia attempted to "extend her code over the whole [Cherokee] country,
abolish its institutions and its laws, and annihilate its political existence. 2 2
Thus, the real conflict was between the state of Georgia and the federal
government.
In holding that Georgia laws could not extend to Cherokee lands, Marshall
first found that in making treaties and passing laws regarding Indian tribes,
the federal government considered "Indian territory as completely separated
from that of the states. 23 Furthermore, the Cherokee Nation comprised a
"distinct community" that retained its right to self-government.24
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2. For an insightful description of the events leading
up to and following Cherokee Nation, see PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 233-49.
17. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
18. Id. at 17-20. Not being a member of one of these classifications is important because the
Constitution grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over states, aliens, and foreign states. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
19. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
20. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515.
21. Id. at 536.
22. Id. at 542.
23. Id. at 557.
24. Id. at 556, 561.
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Additionally, Marshall went on to hold that intercourse with Indian tribes was
completely "vested in the government of the United States. 25  For those
reasons, Georgia laws had no effect on Indian lands.
B. Other Sources of Federal Control
Even before the Court solidified federal authority over Indian matters, the
government had used legislative acts, Indian agents and agencies, and the
military to create and implement Indian policy. Indian policy in the
nineteenth century first consisted of attempts to civilize and educate tribes.26
While not abandoning civilization and education, by the 1830s the
government changed its emphasis to outright removal and eventually
established the reservation system.27 Be it civilization or reservation,
education or removal, as Indian policy evolved, an underlying theme always
remained: "[W]hite settlement should advance and the Indians withdraw., 28
Initially, however, the government structured Indian policy to foster
friendship and create allegiances with the Indian tribes. Specifically, by
regulating Indian trade, the government sought to establish a relationship of
goodwill by protecting tribal interests.29  For example, the government
designed legislation to provide a mechanism to force whites to respect Indian
treaties. 30 These early trade and intercourse acts also established a system of
trade and licensing between Indians and federal agents. To enforce these acts,
Congress created the Indian Department.31 Under this system, Indian agents
implemented policy by reporting violations of the trade and intercourse acts to
military commanders on frontier posts. 32 In turn, the military enforced Indian
policy and regulated the fur trade.33
The government hoped that this well-organized and well-protected system
25. Id. at 561.
26. 2 RICHARD CURRENT, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 1848-1873, at
149 (1976).
27. One author noted the incongruous and contradictory nature of the various federal policies.
Id. at 149-50. Specifically, fostering education proved difficult when Indians were removed to areas
where it was difficult to survive. Id.
28. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 186.
29. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 31-36 (1984) [hereinafter PRUCHA,
FATHER].
30. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 45.
31. Id. at 51-52. The Indian Department was located within the War department, but later
shifted to the Interior Department. 2 CURRENT, supra note 26, at 149.
32. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 56.
33. ROBERT C. NESBIT, WISCONSIN: A HISTORY 83 (2d ed. 1989). Specific to Wisconsin, the
military and Indian agents sought to regulate trade, control contacts with whites, provide for the
peaceable cession of land, and maintain peace generally. Id. at 84-85.
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of trade would serve as a launching pad for its civilization policy. 34 By using
trade to introduce Indians to agriculture and manufactured goods, the
government believed tribes would realize the folly of traditional ways and
adopt white culture. 35 The government also supported efforts by missionary
groups to create schools on Indian lands.36 For instance, in 1819, President
James Monroe allocated a $10,000 civilization fund to organizations that
educated Indian children.37 In addition to these types of direct appropriations,
individual treaties also provided funds for Indian education.38
Attempts at civilization and education occurred simultaneously with the
settlement of Indian lands by whites. As the tide of the American population
began to expand westward, the federal government sought to avoid conflicts
between Indians and white settlers by implementing the removal policy.
39
Although not completely abandoned, civilization and education fell prey to
this new policy.40 For example, one impetus for removal was that through
encounters with white settlers, Indians had adopted all aspects of white
culture, both good and bad.41  This nullified advances made through
civilization and education. Another impetus for removal was the "fear of a
bitter federal-state jurisdictional contest" that had already resulted in a conflict
with the state of Georgia.42 Finally, the removal policy paved the way for
further government acquisition of land and the expansion of settlement.43
Out of the removal policy arose the inevitable question of where removed
Indians should go. In order to prevent hostile encounters with white settlers,
promote civilization, and provide for the general welfare of Indian tribes, the
government established reservations for displaced tribes. Initially, the
government carved small reservations out of original tribal holdings. 44 After
the Civil War, many believed that the best way to open lands for expansion
34. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 214.
35. The government introduced Indians to various "agricultural implements, blacksmith
equipment, hogs and cattle, seeds, looms and spinning wheels, and saw-or gristmills." I ALICE
SMITH, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: FROM EXPLORATION TO STATEHOOD 127 (1973).
36. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note 1, at 219-21.
37. PRUCHA, FATHER, supra note 29, at 151.
38. PRUCHA, POLICY, supra note I, at 223-24.
39. Id. at 224-27.
40. One author noted that "no matter what the government attempted, and no matter which tribe
was involved, the effect was the progressive impoverishment of the Indian peoples." NANCY
OESTREICH LURIE, WISCONSIN INDIANS 14 (1987).
41. PRUCHA, FATHER, supra note 29, at 198.
42. Id. at 195-97. This conflict resulted in Cherokee Nation and Worcester. See supra notes
15-25 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at317.
44. Id. at 562-66.
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and to civilize the Indian was to create one large reservation. 45 This theory
eventually fell out of favor and was replaced by exactly the opposite
approach. Instead of forming a gigantic reservation, the government reduced
reservation sizes and, in some cases, transferred land directly to Indians.46
Ultimately, Indian tribes clung to islands of land floating in a sea of settlement
and development.
III. INDIANS OF WISCONSIN DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
For Indian tribes of Wisconsin, the federal approach created a century of
geographical and political change. Four indigenous tribes, the Potawatomi,
Winnebago, Menominee, and Chippewa, attempted to retain tribal lands and
customs amidst the onslaught of white settlement. Complicating matters was
the arrival of the Oneida, Stockbridge, and Brothertown tribes. Subjects of a
removal policy that was in full force, these three tribes found frustration and
hardship during their long journey from the east coast to their eventual new
homes in Wisconsin.47 To understand Indian involvement in the legal history
of Wisconsin, it is first important to understand who they were, how they
came to be in Wisconsin, and how federal policy affected their lives.
A. Indigenous Tribes
1. The Potawatomi
The Potawatomi lived primarily along the Lake Michigan shoreline and
engaged in seasonal hunting, gathering, and maize cultivation.48  Politically,
the tribe organized into clans based on lineage where leadership was
determined by heredity. 49 The Potowatomi clans did not have chiefs, but were
governed by elders. 50 During the 1600s the Potawatomi negotiated an alliance
45. Id. at 577-81.
46. Id. at 190. The benefits of this approach were twofold. First, Indians could profit by
selling the land; thus, the government could avoid further appropriations. Second, whites could
satisfy their insatiable desire for land by purchasing title from Indians.
47. For example, all three tribes originally relocated to Indiana, where the government
promised them land. Land negotiations, however, fell apart and the tribes migrated to Wisconsin.
LURIE, supra note 40, at 12. Indeed, the author recognizes that many tribes inhabited Wisconsin.
This article does not discuss all of them, but focuses on Wisconsin's primary tribes for which there is
a significant amount of known information.
48. GREAT LAKES RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF AMERICANS FOR INDIAN
OPPORTUNITY, FACTS ABOUT WISCONSIN INDIANS 6 (1973) [hereinafter FACTS]; see also ROBERT
E. BIEDER, NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES IN WISCONSIN, 1600-1960, at 23 (1995).
49. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 23.
50. Id. at 72-73.
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with the French based on the growing fur trade.51 The Potawatomi continued
this relationship with the French, and later the British, well into the 1800s.52
In 1829, the Potawatomi succumbed to pressure to cede tribal lands to the
federal government.53 The tribe signed another treaty in 1833, relinquishing
its remaining claims to Wisconsin lands.54 As compensation, the government
created a reservation for the Potawatomi in Kansas.55 Some clans, however,
refused to relocate "onto the dry, treeless plains" and argued that "they never
ceded their lands east of the Milwaukee River."56 Despite these arguments,
settlement continued, and the Potawatomi were forced either to remove to
Kansas or to flee to Michigan, Indiana, or northern Wisconsin. Eventually,
many Potawatomi resettled in Wisconsin near Marshfield and Lake
Winnebago. However, in the 1870s tensions between the tribe and settlers
arose again.57 Faced with the possibility of further removal, clans either
moved farther north or attempted to create homesteads. Neither strategy
proved to be effective, and many suffered from extreme poverty. 58
2. The Winnebago
The Winnebago held most of their land in what is now south, central, and
western Wisconsin. This tribe engaged in a subsistence lifestyle that included
growing such crops as rice, corn, beans, squash, tobacco, and pumpkins.59
Deer, bear, waterfowl, and fish also constituted an important component of
the Winnebago diet.60 As with the Potawatomi, the Winnebago based their
social and political structure on the clan.6' Clans formed distinct villages of
birch bark lodges that were semi-permanent in nature.62 Clan leaders
comprised a governing council whose rules were enforced by village police.63
In the summer, village hunters joined for communal hunts that extended
throughout the state and beyond.64 With the coming of the French and British,
51. Id.
52. Id. at 106.
53. FACTS, supra note 48, at 6.
54. Id.; BIEDER, supra note 48, at 172.
55. FACTS, supra note 48, at 6.
56. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 172-73.
57. Id. at 173-74. The Dream Dance phenomena enraptured the Potawatomi and gave them a
new mechanism to resist American encroachment. Id. at 174.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 43.
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the Winnebago also became heavily involved in the fur trade.65
In 1822, the Winnebago signed their first treaty with the United States.66
They, along with the Menominee, were persuaded to cede some of their
eastern holdings for the benefit of the displaced Oneida. Over the next fifteen
years the Winnebago entered into a series of treaties that ceded away the
remainder of their lands.67 Many Winnebago, however, either failed to leave
the state or returned to Wisconsin from such places as Minnesota, South
Dakota, and Nebraska.68 In an effort to avoid removal again, many
Winnebago took advantage of the Homestead Act of 1862 and purchased
homesteads.69 While on these settlements, the Winnebago attempted to
continue many of their religious and social practices.
70
3. The Menominee
The Menominee originally established villages of bark and reed lodges on
the Menominee River near Green Bay.71  Migrating fish provided the
Menominee with an important and reliable staple.72 In addition, tribe
members embarked on communal hunts for bear, buffalo, and deer.73 As for
agriculture, the Menominee cultivated wild rice, beans, squash, and some
corn.
7 4 Like the Potawatomi and Winnebago, the political structure of the
Menominee centered on the clan.75 Clans elected their own chiefs who would
then form the village council and create community policy.76  With the
coming of the French also came the fur trade. The fur trade irreversibly
65. Id. at 58.
66. FACTS, supra note 48, at 7.
67. Id. The Winnebago signed treaties in 1827, 1829, 1832, and 1837. Id. However, many
Winnebago considered the 1837 treaty invalid because unauthorized tribesmen signed it. LURIE,
supra note 40, at 20.
68. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 171. In the 1860s and 1870s, many Wisconsin settlers called for
the removal of the Winnebago. The federal government responded in 1871 and 1874 by attempting
to remove the remaining tribe members to Nebraska. On both occasions, over half of the removed
members traveled back to Wisconsin. The government then employed traders that the Winnebago
trusted to persuade them to leave the state. Traders were paid seventy dollars for every Indian that
left Wisconsin. 2 CURRENT, supra note 26, at 48.
69. JOYCE M. ERDMAN, HANDBOOK ON WISCONSIN INDIANS 38 (1966). As a condition of
purchasing the homestead, tribe members had to relinquish their claims to the Nebraska reservation.
Id.
70. Id.
71. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 25.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id.
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altered the economic and political base of the Menominee, leading them
eventually to become dependent on French goods.77 After the British gained
control of the area, French influence still permeated the tribe and would
continue to do so when the Americans arrived.78
American settlements naturally extended to the town of Green Bay, which
rested on the shores of the bay itself, as well as the banks of inland rivers. In
1822 and 1831, the Menominee ceded large tracts of their holdings near
Green Bay to the federal government. 79 The Menominee ceded the remainder
of their lands in 1848.80 Facing ultimate removal to Minnesota, Chief
Oshkosh negotiated a deal that allowed the tribe not only to stay in Wisconsin
but also to resettle on some of their previously held land.81 In 1856, the
Menominee granted a portion of this land back to the government for the
benefit of the Stockbridge. In later years, when many tribes allotted their
lands for personal use, the Menominee decided to keep their lands under tribal
rule.83
4. The Chippewa
The Chippewa realm extended from central Wisconsin to Lake Superior.84
A semi-nomadic tribe, Chippewa culture revolved around hunting, trapping,
and fishing.85 Such an existence did not lend itself to the creation of a strong
political system. Instead of the clan system so prevalent in other Wisconsin
tribes, the Chippewa formed loosely organized bands designed to control
marriages and hunting territories. 86 The Chippewa had extensive contacts
with the French and even became middlemen in fur trade. 7 As with the other
Wisconsin tribes, the Chippewa culture evolved to accommodate, and to a
large extent, depend on, the fur trade. 88
77. Id. at 62.
78. Id. at 143-44.
79. FACTS, supra note 48, at 10. By 1833, the United States acquired all of the land below the
Fox-Wisconsin waterway from the various tribes. I SMITH, supra note 35, at 143.
80. 1 SMITH, supra note 35, at 149.
81. ERDMAN, supra note 69, at 43.
82. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 166.
83. Id. Starting in the 1870s, the Menominee sought to capitalize on their valuable timberlands.
For an interesting discussion of the Menominee's struggle with the Bureau of Indian Affairs over
lumbering rights, see id at 160-61.
84. RONALD N. SATZ, CHIPPEWA TREATY RIGHTS 1 (1991).
85. Id. The dense forests of northern Wisconsin were not fit for agriculture; they were fit only
for hunting and gathering over a widespread area.
86. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 32, 69; SATZ, supra note 84, at 9.
87. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 68.
88. Id. at 67.
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Because of their remote northwoods existence, the Chippewa had minimal
contacts and conflicts with early American settlers. 89  Although the
northwoods had little economic value as farmland, many government officials
prized this region because of its abundance of pine timber.90 Thus, in 1837,
the Chippewa negotiated a sale of their lumbering rights to pine forests in
central Wisconsin.9' Caught in the economic crisis of a declining fur trade,
the Chippewa succumbed to pressure from Indian agents and ceded their lands
along the Lake Superior shoreline in 1842.92 In 1850, the Chippewa faced
removal to Minnesota, which, for the most part, they successfully avoided.93
Finally, in 1854, the federal government created the Bad River, Red Cliff, Lac
du Flambeau, and Lac Court Oreilles reservations in previously held tribal
lands.
B. Removed Tribes
In the early to mid 1800s, three eastern tribes, the Oneida, Stockbridge,
and Brothertown, arrived in Wisconsin.94 Removed from their native lands in
the east, these tribes traveled to Wisconsin to find a place to call home.95
1. The Oneida
Originally part of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Oneida lost much of their
power after the Revolutionary War.96 With the white population growing in
the east, the Oneida faced continued pressure by the federal government to be
removed from their lands. In the 1820s, many Oneida migrated to Wisconsin
and settled on land granted to them by the Menominee and Winnebago.97
After a series of treaties, the Oneida obtained a reservation west of Green Bay
89. FACTS, supra note 48, at 1. For example, the Chippewa did not even have an American
Indian Agent until 1837. SATZ, supra note 84, at 8.
90. SATZ, supra note 84, at 13.
91. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 146. The Chippewa believed they were selling only lumbering
rights, but "[flrom the government point of view... the [Chippewa] had sold their land in central
Wisconsin." Id. In this treaty they also agreed to move beyond Mississippi when the President
requested it. Id. at 166. In fact, territorial Governor Henry Dodge, who also acted as the local
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, was directly "appointed ... to effect a treaty with the Chippewa
Indians for a cession of their lands to the United States." MOSES M. STRONG, THE HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN 261 (1885).
92. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 146-47.
93. ERDMAN, supra note 69, at 14. In three years only two thousand had been removed. Id.
94. For a step by step chronology of the migration see STRONG, supra note 91, at 107-115.
95. One author noted that the New York tribes had already begun to adopt white ways and
many hoped that they would influence the Wisconsin tribes to do the same. I SMITH, supra note 35,
at 142.
96. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 128; see also FACTS, supra note 48, at 8.
97. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 128.
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in 1838.98 During the latter half of the nineteenth century, settlers sought to
open the Oneida reservation for public use. This wish became a reality when
the Oneida participated in the allotment of their reservation after the passage
of the Dawes Act in 1887. 99 Eventually, the Oneida sold off their individual
allotments, reducing the reservation to a fraction of its original size. 00
2. The Stockbridge
The Stockbridge, a Massachusetts tribe, faced many of the same pressures
as the Oneida. White settlers forced the Stockbridge off of their native lands
in 1785.101 The Stockbridge first relocated to New York, then to Indiana, and
eventually to Wisconsin. In the early 1820s, the government negotiated with
the Menominee and Winnebago regarding land in eastern Wisconsin that
could be used for the Stockbridge.' 0 2  Over the next thirty years the tribe
continually removed to lands farther west as settlers expanded out from Green
Bay. During this time, the Stockbridge broke into two factions. One faction,
the Citizen Party, "wanted to divide the reservation into private family
holdings.' 0 3  The other faction, the Indian Party, sought to keep the
reservation in communal hands.'0 4  The Indian Party feared that once the
reservation was divided, it would fall into settlers' hands. 0 5  In 1856, the
Stockbridge were removed to a reservation northwest of Green Bay that was
established pursuant to negotiations with the Menominee and the federal
government. 
06
3. The Brothertown
The Brothertown tribe consisted of two groups of Indians that banded
together in the late 1700s. 10 7 As many as five Algonquian tribes coalesced to
98. ERDMAN, supra note 69, at 30.
99. NESBIT, supra note 33, at 358.
100. Id. at 358.
101. ERDMAN, supra note 69, at 30.
102. NESBIT, supra note 33, at 85; see also BIEDER, supra note 48, at 143.
103. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 165.
104. Id. In 1848, the Stockbridge accepted a treaty whereby the "citizens" would remain on
their lands, and the others would be located to a reservation west of the Mississippi. 2 CURRENT,
supra note 26, at 153. When the time came to remove to the reservation, the Stockbridge simply
refused to leave. Id.
105. BIEDER, supra note 48, at 166. The leader of the Indian Party, John Quinney, strenuously
fought to maintain tribal identity. 2 CURRENT, supra note 26, at 153. For an example of how his
heirs carried the fight to the Wisconsin Supreme Court see infra notes 200-07 and accompanying
text.
106. BtEDER, supra note 48, at 166.
107. Id. at21.
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form the Brothertown tribe in New York. 0 8 This group later joined with a
Delaware tribe named the Brothertown. 0 9 As with the Oneida and the
Stockbridge, the federal government pressured the Brothertown into removing
to the western United States. After arriving in Wisconsin, the Stockbridge
ceded a portion of their land to the Brothertown. 1" 0 In 1832, many tribe
members chose to become citizens and allotted tribal lands to individuals."'
Others joined the Stockbridge on reserved lands near Green Bay, hoping to
maintain tribal community and traditions." 2 Those that accepted citizenship
quickly adopted farming, the English language, and local politics., 13
IV. INDIANS AND THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
Although the federal government played a dominant role in shaping and
implementing policies regarding the Indians of Wisconsin, its dominance was
not complete. The federal government's broad approach to Indian affairs was
ill-equipped to handle the aftermath of policy implementation. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found itself adjudicating cases involving issues in
Indian law on a regular basis. These cases can be broken down into three
categories, each of which represents an area in which the primacy of federal
policy failed to provide Wisconsin with an answer to issues relating to
Indians. To fill the gaps, the court assumed the responsibility to address the
unanswered questions. The first category involved issues relating to property.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court examined the relationship between the state
and federal government regarding a person's ability to acquire and transfer
Indian lands. In addition, the court analyzed the ability of Indians to transfer
title to their land. The second category concerned taxation; specifically,
whether the state could tax Indian lands. The third category dealt with state
jurisdiction over criminal matters regarding Indians.
A. Property Cases
1. State Government, Federal Government, and the Transfer of Indian Land
In Veeder v. Guppy1 4 and Sitzman v. Pacquette,1 5 the Wisconsin
108. Id.
109. Id. The tribe received that name after living on a reservation in Brotherton, New Jersey.
Id.
110. NESBIT, supra note 33, at 85.
111. BEIDER, supra note 48, at 165.
112. Id.
113. 2 CURRENT, supra note 26, at 152-53.
114. 3 Wis. 502 (1854).
115. 13 Wis. 291 (1860).
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Supreme Court recognized federal authority over Indian lands, but skillfully
rationalized decisions that ultimately hinged on state law. The court turned to
state law because the cases explored issues outside the broad scope of federal
law. For example, Veeder concerned a tract of land in Columbia County in
which three persons purported to have claims. 16 The land at issue originally
belonged to the Menominee; however, on August 8, 1846, Congress granted
this tract of land to Wisconsin as part of a larger grant that was "to aid in the
improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers, and to connect the same by a
canal." 17 Two years later, the federal government negotiated a treaty with the
Menominee regarding the same tract. In this treaty the government actually
purchased the land, but allowed the Menominee to continue living there for
two years." 8
On June 29, 1848, one month after statehood, the state legislature formally
accepted the 1846 federal grant." 9 A week later, on August 8, it "passed an
act providing for the sale of the land."' 120 The Menominee were not removed
from this tract until 1852.121 In that same year, the Governor officially made
his land selection, which was approved by the President, and the tract in
question inured to the state. 122 Veeder claimed he owned the land because he
entered and made improvements on it before the August 8, 1848 Act.'
23
Another party, Mars, based her title on the fact that she built a dwelling upon
the land in 1849.124 Guppy filed a claim with the register of the state land
office in 1852, after the Menominee were removed. 25  He argued that the
state did not receive title until after the Menominee removal; thus, the claims
of Mars and Veeder could not stand.1
26
The ultimate question the court faced was when, along the timeline
mentioned above, did the Menominee land vest to the state. In deciding this
question, the court first noted that the federal government was the sole and
116. Veeder, 3 Wis. at 503. None of the three parties were Indians.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 504. The Menominee could even stay longer with the permission of the President.
However, at any time after two years the President could notify the Menominee that the lands were
wanted and they would be forced to leave. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 504-05. The Act contained a provision granting purchase rights to anyone who
made fifty dollars worth of improvement on the land before the passage of the Act. Id. at 518.
124. Id. at 506.
125. Id. at 505.
126. Id. at 508-11. Guppy specifically argued that the land belonged to the Menominee until
June 1, 1852, when the Governor selected and the President approved this particular tract. Id.
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absolute owner of the land and was the "sole and only judge" regarding any
rights the Menominee may have had. 27  In addition, because the federal
government always retained absolute title, the federal government could grant
title to the state at any time. 128 The court also noted that a federal grant takes
effect regardless of whether Indians possessed the land or whether the grant
was made without their consent. 129 Thus, the court held that the land vested to
the state when the grant took effect, which was in 1848, after Wisconsin
became a state. 130 Furthermore, the Act of August 8, 1848 specified how the
land would be partitioned. 13' According to that Act, Veeder had the best title
because he was the first to improve the land.
13 2
In Sitzman, the court analyzed a restriction on an alienation clause that the
government included in a treaty with the Winnebago in 1829.133 The treaty
granted a tract of land to Pierre Pacquette, who was part Winnebago.
134
However, Pacquette could not lease or sell his land without the permission of
the President of the United States. 135 Pacquette died intestate in 1836, leaving
two children. 136 In order to pay off Pacquette's debts, the administrator of
Pacquette's estate sold this land at auction to Sitzman. 137 Pacquette's heirs
brought an action for ejectment, arguing that the land could not be sold for the
payment of debts without the permission of the President.' 38 Sitzman argued
that this alienation clause was either void or ceased with Pacquette's death.
139
The court found for Pacquette's heirs in a divided opinion. Justices Paine
and Cole both wrote opinions, with Justice Dixon taking no part because he
had decided the case at the circuit before his appointment to the supreme
court. 140 Paine held that the probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint the
administrator of Pacquette's estate; therefore, the transfer to Sitzman was
void.' 4 1 Cole did not entirely disagree with this, but felt the case should be
127. Id. at 520. The court stated that "if the United States, in making this grant, violated its
obligations to the Indians, that was a matter with which the state had nothing to do." Id.
128. Id. at 523.
129. Id. at 522.
130. Id. at 525.
131. Id. at 517-18.
132. Id.
133. Sitzman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 291, 292-93 (1860).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 295-96.
138. Id. at 299.
139. Id. at 297.
140. Id. at 291.
141. Id. at 301-05, Wisconsin law provided for the appointment of an administrator under only
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remanded for trial on this issue. In addition to this holding, Cole addressed
the restriction on alienation found in the 1829 treaty. Cole held that the
restriction was void because it was "repugnant to the estate granted."'' 42 He
also opined that the federal government included the restriction to protect
Indians from being cheated out of their property. 43 However, a federal land
patent, Cole reasoned, passed perfect title to the grantee.144 Once title passed
the property, it then became subject to state law. Thus, the land could be
transferred without the permission of the President.
The decisions in Veeder and Sitzman illustrate the ambiguities in certain
aspects of federal Indian law. For instance, in Veeder, federal law failed to
dictate when Indian lands inured to the state after they had been granted. In
Sitzman, federal law deficiently described the applicability of an alienation
clause in certain circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on its
own ingenuity and on state law to solve these ambiguities. In so doing, the
court created a hierarchical relationship between federal, Wisconsin, and
Indian rights regarding land. The court recognized that the federal
government initially held supreme title. In that respect, Wisconsin had no
authority to take or otherwise control lands reserved to Indians. 45 Reserved
Indian land, then, received the most protection from both the federal and state
government. Veeder and Sitzman show that ambiguities arose when Indian
lands left Indian hands.
When the federal government granted Indian land to the state or to an
individual Indian, as occurred in these two cases, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court afforded Indian lands less protection. For example, in Veeder, the
treaty allowed the Menominee to stay on the land for two years and thereafter
until the President directed them to leave. 146  Four years before the
Menominee were actually removed, Veeder made improvements on the land
in question. 147  In recognizing Veeder's title, the court allowed for
development of Indian lands at the earliest possible date. In Sitzman, the
treaty sought to protect Indian interests through an alienation clause. The
only justice to comment on this issue ruled that the restriction was void and
specified circumstances. The court found that none of the circumstances were present in this case.
Id.
142. Id. at 313 (citations omitted). Cole essentially argued that Pacquette received an absolute
estate in fee simple.
143. Id. at 314.
144. Id.
145. Veeder v. Guppy, 3 Wis. 502, 522-23 (1854). The court even stated that the state had no
power to move for the extinction of Indian title. Id.
146. Id. at 504.
147. Id.
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that once title passed from the federal government, state law would control.
Thus, the court in Sitzman also paved the way for early development of Indian
lands. Because federal Indian law provided no guidance regarding Indian
land once the federal government began to relinquish control over it, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court simply filled in the gaps as necessary.
2. Indians and the Ability to Transfer Title
There were also gaps in federal policy regarding land that Indians
acquired individually through treaties with the government. Disputes over
individual land transfers made by Indians eventually reached the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. In Ruggles v. Marsilliott48 and Quinney v. Denny, 49 the
court examined transfers made by members of the Stockbridge tribe.
To fully understand these cases and their holdings, a brief history of
Stockbridge treaties must be reviewed. In 1843, Congress passed an act in
which a portion of the Stockbridge Reservation could be partitioned among
individual Stockbridge and held by them in fee simple. 50  However, title
could not be transferred without a patent.' 51 In 1846, the government repealed
the 1843 act and established a Citizen District and an Indian District." Those
residing in the Citizen District held their land in fee simple, while those in the
Indian District maintained tribal customs.' 53 Also in 1846, the government
granted a portion of the very same land to the state of Wisconsin.154 In 1848,
the Stockbridge negotiated a treaty in which they ceded their land to the
federal government and agreed to move beyond the Mississippi. 55 Many
refused to leave, and in 1856, a new reservation was created.1
56
Amidst this lattice work of treaties and acts arose Quinney and Ruggles.
In both cases individual Stockbridge made transfers pursuant to the 1843
treaty. Quinney transferred his property in 1845. The court held that the 1843
Act gave Quinney equitable title that could be sold and transferred once
Quinney received the appropriate patent. 57 Ruggles proved to be a more
148. 19Wis. 159 (1865).
149. 18Wis. 510(1864).
150. Ruggles, 19 Wis. at 166 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 645 (1843)).
151. Id. The court described the purpose of the Act as follows: "The act of 1843 is based upon
the idea that the Stockbridge Indians would drop the customs of savages, and assume those of
civilized men, and make these lands their permanent home or residence." Id. at 170.
152. Id. at 167.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 169.
155. Id. at 168.
156. Id.
157. Quinney v. Denney, 18 Wis. 485, 488 (1864).
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difficult case. Jonas Thompson, the Stockbridge who received title under the
1843 Act, transferred his land in 1848, after the 1843 Act was repealed.
158
Complicating matters was the adverse party who claimed the land under the
1846 grant to the state.159 Ultimately, the court recognized Jonas Thompson's
title and held that the state never actually acquired title to the Stockbridge
reservation lands under any act of Congress. 
160
The Brothertown also faced similar problems regarding the transfer of
land in Hammer v. Hammer161 and Fowler v. Scott. 162 In Hammer, the widow
of Ira Hammer, a Brothertown, claimed title to land that had been allotted to
Ira pursuant to a treaty.1 63 The widow, Elizabeth Hammer, married Ira in New
York in 1827, but the two separated in 1836.164 Ira then moved to Wisconsin
and started a new family with Betsey Murdock on the Brothertown
reservation. 165 In 1839, Elizabeth also came to the Wisconsin Brothertown
reservation and began living with another man.166  The treaty in question
provided for the partition and division of the Brothertown reservation and
pursuant to its terms, Ira received a portion.' 67 The issue was whether Ira had
proper title at the time of his death, thus entitling Elizabeth to Ira's portion.
168
Finding for Elizabeth, the court held that treaty granted Ira valid equitable
title. 169
The court returned to the very same issue in 1885 with the case of Fowler
v. Scott.170 In Fowler, an 1839 Treaty granted tribe member Hannah Paul a
portion of the Brothertown Reservation. 171 Although Paul never received a
patent, she transferred the land, and it eventually fell into the hands of
Scott. 72 In 1878, the federal government issued a patent for the same plot of
158. Ruggles, 19 Wis. at 167.
159. Id. at 169.
160. Id. at 171. The court noted that all of these acts and treaties were designed to benefit the
Stockbridge tribe by securing certain tracts of land for their use. Id. Ruling that the land had been
granted to the state would have been inconsistent with these acts and treaties. Id.
161. 39 Wis. 182 (1875).
162. 25 N.W. 716 (Wis. 1885).
163. Hammer, 39 Wis. at 182.
164. Id. at 183.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 186.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 187. The court specifically found that Elizabeth showed prima facie evidence, under
state law, that Ira possessed valid title. Id.
170. 25 N.W. 716 (Wis. 1885).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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land to Fowler. 173 Fowler argued that the land was not properly allotted to
Paul, and thus, Scott's title was invalid.174 The court disagreed, holding that a
map identifying the allotment and a report describing all of the 1839
allotments provided sufficient extrinsic evidence to support Paul's initial
title. 175 Thus, the court found that Fowler could not prove that he had better
title than Scott. 176
In Farrington v. Wilson,' 77 the court directly addressed the validity of a
transfer made by a Winnebago of mixed descent. Antoine Grignon, who was
part Winnebago, received a tract of land pursuant to an 1829 treaty.1
78
Grignon transferred his land to Daniel Brodhead who later transferred it to the
defendant Wilson. 179 Farrington, the guardian of Grignon's children, argued
that the original transfer from Grignon to Brodhead was invalid because it was
completed without the permission of the President.180 Wilson argued that the
treaty placed an invalid alienation restriction on the land.'
Using strong language, the court held that "[t]he validity of the restriction
found in the treaty ... is unquestionable."' 82  Deferring completely to the
authority of the federal government, the court noted that "Congress has the
absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of
transferring this property."' 3  Thus, because Grignon failed to solicit the
permission of the President, his transfer to Brodhead was invalid. 1
8 4
These cases show that the Wisconsin Supreme Court supplemented gaps
in federal Indian law regarding land transfers made by Indians. Although the
court often recognized the authority of the federal government, broad federal
policy could not adequately deal with nuances in land transfers that occurred
in a rapidly developing state. When addressing cases of Indian land transfer,
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 719-20. The treaty required that federal commissioners submit a report and map
describing the allotments once the partition and division of the reservation was complete. Id. In this
case, the commissioners mistakenly omitted Hannah Paul's name from the report, but her allotment
appeared on the map. Id. at 718. The court also admitted tribal documents into evidence showing
that the tribe allotted this land to Paul even before the treaty. Id
176. Id. at 721.
177. 29 Wis. 383 (1871).
178. ld. at 385.
179. Id. at 386.
180. Id. The treaty stated that the land could not be leased or sold without the President's
permission. Id. at 385.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
183. Id. (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 400.
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the court actually strengthened federal policy by often finding for the person
who had received title from the federal government. Farrington marks the
only case in which the court failed to approve of the actions of the original
grantee. In that case, however, the court supported federal policy by
upholding the alienation restriction. Furthermore, the court recognized that
Indians often received merely equitable title, and state authority over these
lands was limited. 185  Although the court may have strengthened federal
policy in a sense, the fact that these issues fell to a state court further
illustrates that federal Indian law was not all encompassing.
B. Taxation of Indian Lands
In addition to land transfers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also struggled
with the authority of the state to tax Indian lands. This issue had widespread
ramifications regarding the effectiveness of certain aspects of Indian policy.
Under the civilization policy, the government reduced reservations to private
holdings so that Indians could more easily adopt aspects of white society.'
86
Once the lands became privately owned, they also became subject to
taxation. 87 However, many Indian landowners found themselves in dire
financial straits and unable to meet the tax burden. A default on tax payments
paved the way for state seizure of privately held Indian lands. 88 In effect,
taxation threatened to nullify the civilization policy by rendering private
Indian holdings a financial impossibility.
Against this backdrop, the court analyzed the taxation issue in three cases.
In the first case, Farrington v. Wilson,' 89 the court examined the Wisconsin
statute providing for the taxation of Indian lands. The statute exempted from
taxation lands held by noncitizen Indians, which were not "held by them by
purchase."' 90 In Farrington, the issue rested on the meaning of "held by them
by purchase."' 9' Specifically, the court addressed whether the legislature
intended "purchase" to be construed according to its technical or popular
sense. 192 Under the technical approach purchase meant "the acquisition of
real estate by any means whatever except descent."' 93 The popular sense
185. Id. at 390-91.
186. See supra section II.B.
187. BEIDER, supra note 48, at 172.
188. Id.
189. 29 Wis. 383 (1871).
190. Id. at 392.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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defined purchase as "acquisition of real estate for a valuable consideration."'' 94
The court held that unless otherwise designated by the legislature, the
court must construe words according to their common meanings.195 Thus, for
the purpose of taxation, "purchase" required an exchange of valuable
consideration. The court then ruled that the initial transfer to Grignon, who
was part Winnebago, did not constitute a sale, but merely a gift that the
legislature did not intend to tax.' 96 The court further held that the exemption
extended to Grignon's heirs.197 Providing implicit support for civilization, the
court noted that Grignon's heirs had been removed out of state and had no
means to pay for any tax that would be assessed. 98 Conversely, any Indian
who adopted the ways of the whites and had the ability to purchase land
should expect to be taxed.199
The court again addressed this issue in Quinney v. Town of Stockbridge 200
and Hilgers v. Quinney.20 1 Both of these cases involved the same plaintiff and
the same plot of land. In Quinney v. Town of Stockbridge, the plaintiff argued
that he received his land by descent as heir-at-law from John Quinney, a
Stockbridge Indian.20 2 Thus, his land could not be taxed because it was not
held by purchase. The town argued that the land could be taxed because the
plaintiff lived apart from, and was not otherwise connected with, the tribe.2 °3
Showing none of the sympathy that accompanied the Farrington decision two
years earlier, the court found for the town. Specifically, the court held that the
plaintiff never proved that the original grantee, John Quinney, did not hold the
land by purchase.20 4 The court further held that if the land were held by
purchase, it would remain so regardless of to whom it was transferred. Thus,
Indians receiving land by purchase would have to pay taxes even if they
194. Id.
195. Id. at 393.
196. Id. at 392-93. Referring to lands that Indians did not hold by purchase, the court stated:
"It was totally incompetent for the legislature of this state, under the constitution of the United States,
and that of this state, to tax such lands." Id. at 394. Furthermore, the court noted that the federal
government retained sole power and control over Indian lands not held by purchase. Id.
197. Id. at 396.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 395.
200. 33 Wis. 505 (1873).
201. 8 N.W. 17 (Wis. 1881).
202. Quinney, 33 Wis. at 506. John Quinney strenuously advocated the Indian Party position
within the Stockbridge tribe. See supra notes 101-05, 157-60 and accompanying text; see also
BIEDER, supra note 48, at 165. In a strange bit of historical irony, these two cases turned on the
court's determination that John Quinney, by virtue of accepting a land grant, severed ties with the
tribe and adopted civilized life.
203. Quinney, 33 Wis. at 506.
204. Id. at 508.
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maintained tribal customs. 2° 5 In Hilgers, the court reaffirmed this holding by
finding that John Quinney and the plaintiff divorced and separated themselves
from the Stockbridge tribe by virtue of accepting the land grant.20 6  The
Hilgers court also examined the actual patent and ruled that the land was
transferred in exchange for valuable consideration.0 7 For these reasons, the
court deemed the tax assessment appropriate.
In addressing the tax issue, the court strove to incorporate a purely state
matter into existing federal Indian policy. For example, the tax cases show
that Indians who bought and sold land and otherwise adopted white culture
would become subject to state tax law, while those who clung to traditional
ways would remain under federal authority. Whether this supported federal
Indian policy is debatable. Indians were often removed to barren parts of the
state, with poor hunting and worse soil. Thus, it is unlikely that Indians
attempting to farm this land after receiving personal allotments could generate
enough revenue to pay taxes. Under the worst case scenario, attempts at
civilization could lead to de facto removal. However, the tax cases illustrate
the court's willingness to exert state authority when it believed federal
authority ceased.
C. Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues constituted the final area in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court delved into the realm of Indian affairs. The court first
addressed the issue of criminal jurisdiction in State v. Doxtater.2 °8 In that
case, the court determined whether the state criminal code extended to Indian
reservations. Doxtater, an Oneida, committed adultery on the Oneida
reservation with a non-Indian.20 9 After being convicted, Doxtater appealed,
arguing that state courts had no jurisdiction over him because of his status as
an Indian. The court held that anyone residing within the boundaries of a
state was subject to the laws of the state unless jurisdiction had been
exempted.210 In turn, a treaty, constitution, or act of the United States may
exempt jurisdiction. In the absence of such an exemption, the state was
205. Id. at 509.
206. Hilgers, 8 N.W. at 18.
207. Id.
208. 2 N.W. 439 (Wis. 1879). Territorial Wisconsin also addressed the issue of crimes
committed by Indians. In such cases, Judge James Doty made it clear that the territorial courts had
jurisdiction only when white men were involved. I SMITH, supra note 35, at 219.
209. The other party in this affair was Elizabeth Harris. State v. Harris, 2 N.W. 543 (Wis.
1879). The court summarily upheld her adultery conviction after deciding Doxtater. Id.
210. Doxtater, 2 NW. at 446-47.
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assumed to have jurisdiction when it was admitted to the union.2 '
When applying these rules to the case at hand, the court found that
Wisconsin retained criminal jurisdiction over the Oneida reservation. 1 First,
the Oneida reservation rested wholly within state boundaries.2t 3 Second, the
court found no federal exemption that precluded the state from assuming
criminal jurisdiction over the Oneida.21 4 Thus, under the Tenth Amendment,
Wisconsin took jurisdiction over Indian criminal matters because the federal
government did not explicitly reserve jurisdiction.21 5
Subsequent to this decision, federal law largely preempted Indian criminal
law. In 1885, Congress enacted a law that extended federal criminal
jurisdiction to tribal lands.21 6 A year later, the United States Supreme Court
examined the authority of Congress to pass such an act in United States v.
Kagama.217 The court held that by virtue of Indian's status as wards of the
nation, Indian criminal matters fell within congressional jurisdiction. In
addition, the Court noted that the 1885 Act applied only to crimes committed
by Indians on Indian lands.218
Although the 1885 law and Kagama essentially nullified the Doxtater
holding, the reasoning in Doxtater endured.219 In Stacy v. La Belle,22 ° the
Wisconsin Supreme Court used this reasoning to extend state jurisdiction to a
contract action involving a Menominee Indian who failed to pay the purchase
price for goods. Despite numerous federal trade and intercourse acts, the
court stated that it could find no federal statute or treaty that precluded a state
from assuming jurisdiction over a contract action.22 1 Finally, in Schriber v.
211. Id. at 448. The court distinctly noted that the United States could punish Indians for
crimes committed in U.S. territories. Id. However, this power ceased once the state was admitted to
the Union. Id.
212. Id. at 451-52.
213. Id.
214. Id. at451.
215. Id. at 448.
216. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
217. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
218. Id. at 383, cited in State v. Rufus, 237 N.W. 67, 71 (Wis. 1931).
219. The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly and officially reversed Doxtater in 1931. State
v. Rufus, 237 N.W. 67, 71 (Wis. 1931).
220. 75 N.W. 60 (Wis. 1898).
221. Id. at 62. The court stated that:
In the absence of any federal statute or treaty to the contrary, and upon the principles
stated, we must hold that a state court may take jurisdiction of an action on contract in
favor of a white man, and against an Indian belonging to a tribe and a particular
reservation.
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Town of Langlade,222 the court cited to Doxtater in holding that the state had
the authority to include the Menominee reservation within the physical
boundaries of a town.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized federal jurisdiction over Indian
matters only when it had specifically been asserted. This represents a subtle
but significant departure from the federal perspective. From Fletcher through
Kagama and from the first trade and intercourse act through the Act of 1885,
the federal government asserted jurisdiction over Indians by classifying them
as non-American and non-foreigners, outside of the purview of the state but
worthy of government protection. Uniquely defining Indians as "wards of the
nation," the federal government carried out the policies of civilization,
education, and removal, while attempting to leave Indians with as much
autonomy as possible. This complicated endeavor was made more
complicated when a state asserted Indian jurisdiction. However, by asserting
jurisdiction when it was not specifically precluded, Wisconsin simply sought
to exercise its own judgment over matters affecting both the development of
the state and the people within its boundaries.
V. INDIANS AND THE WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE
During the nineteenth century, the Wisconsin legislature addressed state
specific issues that fell outside the scope of federal Indian policy. Through
constitutional provisions, statutes, uncodified general laws, memorials, and
joint resolutions, the legislature created a legal identity for Wisconsin Indians
under state law. For example, the legislature used the state constitution and
statutes to implement state policies regarding Indian suffrage, taxation, and
gaming. In addition, for matters concerning specific tribes or narrow issues,
the legislature turned to uncodified general laws, memorials, and joint
resolutions.
A. The Constitution and Statutes
Wisconsin's very first constitution set forth parameters regarding Indian
voting rights within the state. The Indian Suffrage Clause granted voting
rights to "[p]ersons of Indian blood, who have once been declared by law of
congress to be citizens of the United States, any subsequent law of congress to
the contrary notwithstanding. 223 Other persons qualified to vote included
"[c]ivilized persons of Indian descent, not members of any tribe. 224 The
legislature eventually codified these suffrage provisions into the Wisconsin
222. 29N.W. 547 (Wis. 1886).
223. WIs. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 3 (1848).
224. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 4 (1848).
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22statutes.25 In 1879, the legislature amended Indian suffrage laws to include a
specific provision relating to the Chippewa. These sections provided voting
rights to any Chippewa who subscribed to an oath that he was not a member
of a tribe and had not made a claim to the United States for aid.226 Finally, an
1898 constitutional amendment specified where Indians who had the right to
vote could vote.227
In addition to voting rights, the legislature passed laws concerning
taxation 228 and Indian hunting and gaming. Regarding the latter, the
legislature exempted Indians from many of the fish and game restrictions. For
example, unlike other residents of the state, Indians could use certain types of
nets to fish.229  They could also hunt or trap a wider variety of animals
including grouse, woodcocks, ducks, geese, and other fowl. 230 The caveat to
these exemptions was that the Indian must be "uncivilized," and the activity
must occur on the reservation.23'
Finally, like the federal government, the state did not hesitate to take an
extremely paternalistic approach regarding the issue of Indians and liquor.
Hoping to keep Indians from acquiring alcohol, the legislature criminalized
the sale of intoxicating liquors to Indians.232 To ensure its effectiveness, the
statute imposed duties upon Indian agents, local sheriffs, and constables to
enforce the provisions of the law whenever they had good reason to believe it
had been violated.233
B. Uncodifled Laws, Memorials, and Joint Resolutions
The majority of these kinds of legislative pieces concerned the
relationship between the citizenry of Wisconsin, Indians, and land. First,
uncodified laws provided an outlet through which the people and the
legislature could promote the development of the state within the framework
of federal Indian policy. For example, as early as 1838 the territorial
legislature passed an act for the partition of lands originally reserved to Fox
Indians of mixed descent.234 An act passed on August 8, 1848, which became
225. WIS. STAT. tit. 11, chap. 6, § 1, cls. 3, 4 (1849).
226. WIS. STAT. tit. II, chap. 5, § 12a (1879).
227. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (1898).
228. See supra Part IV.B; see also WIS. REV. STAT. tit. V, chap. 15, § 4, cl. 7 (1849)
(exempting property owned by noncitizen Indians, except when purchased by them).
229. WIS. REV. STAT. chap. 183 (1878).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Wis. REV. STAT., tit. XI, chap. 30 (1849).
233. Id.
234. 1838 Wis. Laws 54. By act of congress on June 30, 1834, Fox and Sacs "half breeds"
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of paramount importance in Veeder v. Guppy, serves as another example. 235
That Act created the mechanism through which former Menominee lands
were to be divided. Thus, the legislature used uncodified laws to link the
results of federal treaties to the assertion of state authority over former Indian
lands.
Second, the legislature used memorials to both the President of the United
States and Congress in an attempt to enforce rights over land holdings.
Memorials to the President mainly consisted of complaints by the populace
concerning specific Indian tribes.236 For instance, in 1849 and 1857, the
legislature submitted memorials regarding the Chippewa.2 37 Residents of
northern counties complained that bands of Chippewa raided houses, abused
women, stole crops, and otherwise impeded the development of the State.
The legislature requested that the President either confine the Chippewa to
their reservation or remove them farther west.
238
Memorials to Congress sought a variety of objectives. First, some
memorials requested that Congress obtain certain tracts of land from Indian
tribes through the treaty process. For example, an 1848 memorial sought the
survey and sale of portions of the Menominee reservation. 239  In an 1859
memorial regarding Stockbridge lands, the legislature again sought to
expedite the survey of recently acquired tribal holdings.240 Other memorials
sought to regulate the price of Indian lands appearing on the market.2 4'
Finally, through joint resolutions to Congress, the legislature voiced
concerns regarding Indian lands. In an 1846 resolution, the territorial
legislature noted the importance of the Fox River valley and asked Congress
were granted the right to convey previously reserved land. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 167, 4 Stat. 740.
The Wisconsin act provided for the partition of this land to all those who had claims under the 1834
congressional act.
235. See supra Part IV.A.
236. The territorial government also used memorials to notify the President of problems
relating to Indians. In 1839, the Governor requested four companies of dragoons to quell Winnebago
demonstrations and remove them if necessary. SATZ, supra note 84, at 281.
237. See, e.g., WIS. REV. STAT., tit. XI, chap. 30 (1849).
238. 1849 Wis. Laws Joint Mem'l, ch. 7; 1857 Wis. Laws 803 Joint Mem'l, ch. 11. The state
government was often more than willing to rely on the federal government when a precarious
situation arose. For example, with the resurgence of Indian uprisings in the Midwest in 1860s,
Governor Edward Salomon requested that the government arm local recruits to protect against the
potential threat. 2 CURRENT, supra note 26, at 320-21. Salomon also felt that the "federal
government ought to assume responsibility for the Wisconsin Winnebago" regarding their possible
removal. Id. at 321.
239. 1848 Wis. Laws 333 Joint Mem'l 5.
240. 1859 Wis. Laws 255 Joint Mem'l 10.
241. 1864 Wis. Laws 557 Joint Mem'l 10.
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to extinguish all Indian title along the river.242 However, not all joint
resolutions recommended action adverse to Indian interests. An 1867 joint
resolution sought the removal of the Stockbridge to better land than they
currently occupied, for the reservation contained poor soil and the climate
made farming difficult.
2 43
Taken as a whole, these legislative measures proliferated federal policy to
the extent that it coincided with state interests. For example, the Wisconsin
Constitution and statutes implicitly promoted the civilization policy by
allowing only Indians who adopted white culture to vote. In acts pertaining to
taxation and gaming, the legislature protected the sanctity of the reservation
system by exempting Indians from state restrictions. The legislature
promoted state interests in Indian lands through the use of general laws,
memorials, and resolutions. At times, the legislature requested that Indians be
confined to their reservations; other times it sought their outright removal.
Although these land matters, as well as voting, taxation, and gaming, can all
be considered Wisconsin specific issues, the legislature sought to create state
law in these areas while still working within the framework of federal policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contacts that the Wisconsin Supreme Court and state legislature had
regarding Indian affairs show that despite the primacy of federal authority,
states still addressed issues in this area. In a practical sense, the federal
government could implement broad policies applicable to all Indian tribes.
However, these broad policies lacked the intricacy to mandate a response to
every contact between an Indian and a state or its citizens. By way of
analogy, it may be helpful to think of federal Indian policy as a net and the
states as the water it passes through. Although the net may be designed to
catch everything, something small invariably will escape capture and remain
in the water. So it is with issues in Indian law. Federal policy created a net of
preemption, but some issues simply fell through to the states.
Specific to Wisconsin, the court faced issues pertaining to the transfer of
Indian land, taxation, and jurisdiction. On the surface, these issues appear to
fall under the authority of the federal government. The United States
Supreme Court unequivocally established federal authority over Indian land in
Fletcher and Johnson. Regarding taxation and jurisdiction, the Court in
Worcester and Cherokee Nation essentially stated that Indians comprised
domestic dependent nations not subject to the laws of the state.
242. 1846-48 Wis. Laws 222 H.R.J. Res.
243. 1867 Wis. Laws 188 H.R.J. Res. 2.
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The cases that the Wisconsin court faced did not challenge the ultimate
authority of the federal government; rather, these cases addressed questions
that arose when federal Indian policy stopped providing answers. For
example, all of the property cases concerned tracts of Indian land that the
federal government allocated to either the state or private parties for personal
use. In Veeder and Sitzman, the court recognized the authority of the federal
government, but questioned when Indian lands granted by the federal
government actually inured to either the state or private hands. Additionally,
the court in Ruggles, Quinney, Hammer, Fowler, and Farrington addressed
the validity of land transfers made by Indians after they personally acquired
the land from the federal government.
The court also examined Wisconsin's law exempting Indian lands from
taxation. This exemption signified Wisconsin's adherence to the notion of
federal supremacy over Indian land. However, the cases of Farrington,
Quinney, and Hilgers illustrate that ambiguities in federal policy existed.
Specifically, the court struggled with incorporating tribal lands that had been
partitioned for private use into the Wisconsin tax system. The essence of each
case concerned whether the land was held "by purchase," thereby making it
taxable. This issue required the court to examine how Indians received land
for private personal use from the federal government. However, nothing in
the federal grants or policy dictated how states should treat land transferred in
such a manner. Thus, the court decided taxation issues based on its
interpretation of existing state law.
Finally, in Doxtater and Stacy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed
issues of criminal and general jurisdiction, respectively. In both cases, the
court noted that the United States could prevent the states from assuming
jurisdiction over Indian affairs through use of the Constitution, a treaty, or an
act. Once again, the court explicitly acknowledged federal authority.
However, in Doxtater the court held that no act or treaty by the federal
government preempted state criminal law regarding adultery. The court used
similar reasoning to extend state jurisdiction to a contract case in Stacy.
Doxtater and Stacy provide perhaps the clearest example of the court
addressing an issue in Indian law because of gaps in federal authority.
The Wisconsin legislature addressed Indian matters by utilizing the
constitution, acts, memorials, and resolutions. The legislature used these
measures in conjunction with federal Indian policy, not as mechanisms to
subvert it. For instance, the state passed measures respecting an Indian tribe's
right to hunt on reserved land. These measures implicitly supported the
reservation policy. The legislature also used memorials and resolutions to
either request certain tracts of land, or to inform the federal government that
Indians were causing disturbances while off their land. In both cases, the
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desired effect was to expedite the removal of Indians or to compel them to
stay on reservations. This is precisely what the federal government was also
trying to accomplish, only on a larger scale.
In addressing questions of Indian affairs, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and legislature both recognized, and even deferred to, federal authority
regarding Indian law. This was not a case of Wisconsin taking a radical
approach to Indian affairs in an attempt to either change, circumvent, or dilute
federal authority. In addition, the holdings of the cases and the legislative
results are, for all practical purposes, unremarkable. They essentially show
that Wisconsin attempted to work within the framework of federal Indian
policy. However, what is of interest is that Wisconsin dealt with some of
these issues at all. The very presence of these issues suggests that despite
preemption, federal authority could not, and did not, cover every conceivable
contact between Indians and a state. In essence, the fallacy of total
preemption created a lost chapter in the legal history of Wisconsin.
* * *
